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C ARRY-ON BAGGAGE HAS been a major concern in the avi-
ation industry for many years. It has continually raised
safety, economic and logistical issues. For almost thirty years,
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has attempted to
regulate carry-on baggage in order to encourage airlines to im-
plement safe carry-on baggage policies and to enforce safety
regulations.
In 1967, the FAA promulgated the first of many federal regu-
lations governing carry-on baggage. In addition to proper stow-
age regulations, these regulations provided guidelines to the
airlines regarding control of the size and types of passenger
carry-ons permitted in the cabin of an aircraft. Each of these
regulations was designed to enhance cabin safety for the airline
passenger.
In spite of these regulatory efforts, carry-on baggage contin-
ues to create safety concerns. The industry and government
continue to seek ways to solve the dilemma. This Article will
trace the history of aviation carry-on baggage regulations and
the specific problems the regulations have attempted to solve. It
will also look at solutions the industry has introduced regarding
carry-on baggage. Finally, this Article will analyze whether any
of these industry or governmentally conceived measures have
been effective by reviewing recent litigation involving cabin inju-
ries caused by falling carry-on baggage.
* J.D., Gonzaga University School of Law, 1997. The author served as a legal
intern for the Federal Aviation Administration Chief Counsel's Office, Regula-
tions Division, in Spring 1997, and has fifteen years of airline industry experi-
ence, including twelve years as a flight attendant. She is presently an associate at
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Gaffney-Brown, practicing in the area of employ-
ment law.
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A. BRIEF HISTORY
When the Wright Brothers took to the air in 1903, the least of
their concerns was where to safely stow the luggage.1 Staying in
the air was challenge enough. However, from very early on in
commercial aviation, baggage service was a factor. As early as
1929, airline service included having a courier meet the arriving
passenger and take charge of the luggage.2
Competition was tough among the early pioneer airlines (just
as it is today), and many did not survive.3 Each airline endeav-
ored to create an innovative service to give it an edge on its com-
petitors. In one such competitive move, an airline hired the first
flight attendants in 1930. 4 These first flight attendants were re-
quired to be nurses and baggage agents, having to carry passen-
ger baggage on board the aircraft as part of their duties.5 One
aviation historian recounted that if seats were full, the flight at-
tendants could be found seated on a mailbag or suitcase at the
rear of the plane.' Another airline was known to have its
mechanics stop their other duties to hustle baggage off the air-
craft to the passengers in the waiting room.' Even in the earliest
days of commercial aviation, competition included service, and
service included accommodating a passenger's baggage.
During the 1950s, the flying experience changed from ca-
tering to the wealthy to competing for the masses. 8 The eco-
nomic growth and stability following World War II paved the
way for airline travel to become a more acceptable and timely
way to reach a destination.' As large companies decentralized,
the airlines started competing for the traveling businessman."
As a result of increased business travel, the travel industry
started to boom." By the end of the decade, businessmen were
starting to combine business and pleasure, and golf bags were
I See FRANKJ. TAYLOR, HIGH HORIZONS 61, 67, 107 (1964).
2 See CARL SOLBERG, CONQUEST OF THE SKIES: A HIsToRY OF COMMERCIAL AVIA-
"rION IN AMERICA 110 (1979).
3 See id. at 162.
4 See id. at 211.
5 See id. at 212-14.
6 See id.
7 See id. at 352.
8 See id. at 376.
9 See id.
10 See id.
I See id. at 377.
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beginning to be weighed, along with the briefcases and over-
night bags.' 2
By the 1960s, jet travel was common. Between 1955 and 1972,
the number of passengers flying commercially grew from 7 mil-
lion to 32 million per year. 3 Speed became a matter of public
convenience and necessity.' 4 Prior to the latest telecommunica-
tions developments, jet air travel probably had the single great-
est impact on our modern society.' 5 One author ended his
recount of aviation history by stating that the "miracle of flight
had been triumphantly turned into a repetitive and unexcit-
ing routine. The adventure was over. 16 However, the new chal-
lenges of efficiently, safely and competitively moving the masses
had really just begun.
B. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD OVERSIGHT AND THE EFFECTS OF
ITS DEMISE
For many years, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated
the business side of the aviation industry by controlling prices,
routes and entries into markets.' 7 This ensured that each com-
pany received its fair share of business in order to survive.' 8
However, in 1978, under pressure from airlines to control their
own destiny, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978.19 The stated purpose of the Act was to "encourage, de-
velop, and attain an air transportation system which relies on
competitive market forces to determine the quality, variety, and
price of air services, and for other purposes. ' 20 As part of the
Act, the CAB was phased out. With no regulatory control over
prices and routes, competition increased. Both new and old air-
lines struggled to carve a niche in new and old markets. Not all
were successful. However, the Act was seen as being in the pub-
lic's interest because competition would force the airlines to be
more efficient and would lower prices for the consumer.2'
12 See id.
13 See id. at 406.
14 See id. at 411.
15 See id.
16 Id. at 413.
17 See ROBERT M KANE & ALLAN D. VOSE, AIR TRANSPORTATION 14-4 (8th ed.
1982).
18 See id.
19 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705-54
(1978) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40120 (1994)).
20 Id. at pmbl.
21 See KANE & VOSE, supra note 17, at 14-5.
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In many ways, deregulation has accomplished many of its
goals. Analysts agree that deregulation has increased and im-
proved plane utilization, passenger load factors and productiv-
ity. 2 2 As air fares came down, air travel increased.2 3 However,
with this substantial increase in air travel, airlines had to find
additional airport space and facilities to handle the increased
demands for loading and unloading passengers, turn-around
maintenance and air cargo, as well as passenger luggage. 24 Air-
lines responded to the increased baggage accommodation prob-
lem by encouraging passengers to take more on board with
them.2 ' Ads began to appear in newspapers promoting the ad-
vantages of carrying on luggage and the airline's larger, on-
board accommodations for these items. 2" It was just a matter of
time before the FAA stepped in to impose safety restrictions on
how and what could be properly and safely stowed in a passen-
ger cabin.
II. REGULATORY EFFORTS
The initial rule regulating carry-on baggage was promulgated
in 1967 with six amendments following. This regulation and its
revisions are summarized below. The 1987 amendment, in par-
ticular, will be looked at in depth. Though ten years old, the
process leading up to the 1987 revision reveals the burdensome
process required to get a new regulation promulgated. It also
reveals the different industry interests that still impact strict
compliance with the regulation.
A. THE INITIAL 1967 REGULATION
The first carry-on baggage regulation occurred as part of an
effort by the FAA to amend Part 121 to improve emergency evac-
uation equipment requirements and operating procedures for
transport category airplanes.27 In 1966, the FAA issued a Notice
22 See id.
23 See id. at 14-15.
24 See id.
2,5 See Bill Melvin, Air Line Pilots Association, Chairman of Airworthiness and
Performance Division, Remarks at the Carry-On Baggage Seminar (July 11,
1985). This seminar was held as a public meeting following the publishing of the
Association of Flight Attendants' Petition for Rulemaking on Carry-On Baggage
in the Federal Register.
2(i See id.
27 See Crashworthiness and Passenger Evacuation, 31 Fed. Reg. 10,275 (1966)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 121.589) (proposed July 29, 1966).
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of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), stating proposed additions to
the then current Part 121 and provided supporting documenta-
tion for the changes.28 The proposed changes included a new
section entitled "Carry-on Baggage. ' 29 The administrative pro-
cess of publishing an NPRM then gave different industry and
public interests affected by the proposed rule the opportunity to
bring facts and opinions to the attention of the FAA. Through
this process, various interests attempted to influence the way in
which the rule would be finalized. 0
The issue of regulating carry-on bags specifically evolved
under a discussion of problems associated with crashworthiness
and emergency evacuation procedures. The FAA was concerned
that dislodged carry-on bags could potentially cause injuries and
hamper emergency evacuations during hard and crash landing
conditions." The FAA also stated that an increase in carry-on
baggage being brought on the aircraft at the last moment as a
result of recent industry developments (such as shuttle service
and space available student fares) had created a serious safety
concern.
3 2
In this initial regulatory effort, the FAA recognized that the
increase in the number of bags being stowed on and around
passenger seats posed a potentially significant danger in an
emergency.33 The FAA proposed to limit carry-on bags to only
those carry-ons that could fit under the seat and not slide for-
ward during a crash. 4 This meant that airlines would have to
retrofit passenger seats with some type of restraining system.
The new regulation was proposed as section 121.589.
After reviewing comments from the public and industry, the
FAA issued its final rule amending Part 121 and included the
newly codified section 121.589.6 However, as a result of com-
ments received by the FAA to the proposed amendments, the
provisions of the new section were "revised and clarified to per-
mit more effective enforcement."3 7  Additionally, the ban
28 See id.
29 See id. at 10,282.
30 See id. at 10,275.
31 See id.
32 See id. at 10,278.
33 See id.
34 See id. at 10,282.
35 See id.
36 See Carry-On Baggage, 14 C.F.R. § 121.589 (1968).
37 Crashworthiness and Passenger Evacuation Standards, 32 Fed. Reg. 13,255,
13,262 (1967) (to be codified as 14 C.F.R. § 121.589).
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against stowing baggage under the seat unless it could be re-
strained was postponed until April 24, 1969.38 This gave the in-
dustry time to come up with a means of limiting the movement
of articles from under cabin passenger seats. 9
The FAA further stated that it would consider additional revi-
sions to the regulations as state-of-the-art technology allowed
them to further increase the possibility of crash survival.4" In
spite of the requests by some commenters to delay the imple-
mentation of many of the proposed changes, the FAA thought it
in the public interest to get the new rule finalized.41 Finalizing
the rule at that point forced the airlines to work on implement-
ing the changes without further delay.4 2
B. THE 1969 AMENDMENT
As part of a revision of Part 121 in 1969, the FAA agreed to
postpone the compliance date for underseat restraints for carry-
on baggage. Several air carriers had been unable to implement
the new regulation and needed additional time to make the re-
quired changes.4 3 The FAA thus published a revision to section
121.589(b), giving the aviation industry a new compliance date
of August 24, 1969, and provided for a possible extension to Oc-
tober 24, 1969, by showing "good cause."44
C. THE 1972 AMENDMENT
In 1972, as part of the continuing effort to improve
crashworthiness, emergency evacuation requirements, and oper-
ating procedures, the FAA made two substantive additions to
section 121.589.41 As the size and passenger capacity of trans-
port category aircraft increased, so did the FAA's concern about
crashworthiness and passenger evacuation effectiveness.46 The
need to facilitate a more rapid evacuation from larger aircraft
38 See id. at 13,268.
39 See id. at 13,262.
40 See id. at 13,255.
41 See id.
42 See id. See also Appendix 1, infra, at 595.
43 See Crashworthiness and Passenger Evacuation, 34 Fed. Reg. 5,543, 5,544
(1969) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 121.589).
44 See id. at 5,545. See also Appendix 2, infra, at 596.
45 See Crashworthiness and Passenger Evacuation Standards, 37 Fed. Reg. 3,964




with minimum passenger confusion guided the FAA as it drafted
additional, more specific language.
47
The first of the substantive additions stated that an airplane
could not take-off or land without bags being properly stowed."
The second addition stated that passengers must comply with
instructions given by crewmembers regarding the proper stow-
age of their carry-ons.49 Since the compliance date had passed
for retrofitting passenger seats with baggage restraints, a new
subsection (c) was written to mandate that all seats under which
baggage was stowed have a restraining system.5 °
In the preamble to the final rule published in the Federal
Register, the FAA noted that numerous comments were received
to the initial NPRM.5' Some commentators still refused to rec-
ognize the safety implications of improperly stowed baggage and
cited passenger inconvenience in being forced to check bags.52
However, the FAA strongly disagreed and stated that safety con-
cerns far outweighed passenger inconvenience.53 Other com-
mentators pointed out that safety restraints should only be
mandatory if, in fact, the area under the seat was used to stow
carry-ons.54 The FAA agreed with this comment and adjusted
the language of the final regulation.55
D. THE 1980 AMENDMENT
In the 1980 revision, the FAA again substantively expanded
section 121.589.56 In order to emphasize that the air carrier
(and notjust the flight attendants) had the ultimate responsibil-
ity to ensure that baggage was properly stowed, the FAA added a
new sentence to section 121.589(a) specifically placing the re-
sponsibility on the air carrier.57 Under section 121.589(a) (1),
the FAA defined what a "suitable" closet, baggage or cargo stow-
age area meant (placarded for weight, properly restrained, and
47 See id.
48 See id. at 3,976.
49 See id.
50 See id. See also Appendix 3, infra, at 597.





56 See Air Carriers Certification, Operations, and Airworthiness, 45 Fed. Reg.
41,586, 41,594 (1980) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 121.589).
57 See id.
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emergency equipment not blocked). 8 Section 121.589(b) now
stated what the specific restrictions were for carry-on items in
the overhead racks.59 Section 121.589(c) changed "shall com-
ply" to "must comply" regarding a passenger's affirmative duty
to follow crewmembers' instructions regarding carry-on stow-
age."' Finally, section 121.589(d) required side restraints on all
aisle seats where baggage was stowed.6'
These changes were in response to numerous flight attendant
comments. The flight attendants stated that: (1) they were be-
ing forced to store baggage that could not be properly stored;
(2) boarding agents were not enforcing the carry-on baggage
regulations prior to passenger boarding; (3) passengers became
irate when challenged; (4) lack of specific regulatory require-
ments put the flight attendant at odds with passengers, their
company and other airline employees; and (5) the burden of
compliance with federal regulations should be put on the certifi-
cate holder.62 The rewording of section 121.589(a) and (c)
strengthened crew authority and again attempted to prevent air
carriers from shifting responsibility for proper stowage of all
carry-on baggage to the flight attendants only.63 Additionally,
passengers were now subject to civil penalties if they failed to
comply with crewmembers' instructions regarding the proper
stowage of carry-on baggage.64
The addition of side restraint requirements on passenger
seats for underseat stowage of carry-ons was a result of com-
ments made on the initial regulation requiring forward re-
straints. The FAA initially thought that side restraints were
already being used, but to avoid any question, they specifically
spelled out this requirement in the 1980 revision. Originally,
the FAA wrote the rule to include side restraints on each passen-
ger seat, but then adjusted the rule to apply only to aisle seats in
response to industry comments. 65 While some commentators
objected to the side restraints as unnecessary, the FAA dis-
agreed. It stated that the side restraints were needed as the then











fective."66 Those procedures allowed carry-on baggage to be
thrown into the aisles, potentially inflicting injury and hamper-
ing a quick evacuation in both a hard and crash landing.6 7
Other commentators complained of the cost involved in retrofit-
ting all aisle seats with restraint bars.6" The FAA stated that in
spite of the cost to the airlines, these costs were insignificant in
comparison with the safety benefits achieved.69 However, in an
attempt to pacify the strong complaints from the air carriers, the
FAA gave the industry three years in which to comply.70
Between 1967 and 1980, a great deal of progress was made in
furthering cabin safety. With the implementation of the 1980
regulation on carry-on baggage, regulations now detailed spe-
cific criteria in four important safety areas: (1) that the airplane
not take off or land until every piece of luggage was properly
stowed; (2) that all carry-on baggage be properly stowed and
what that meant; (3) that crewmembers had the authority to en-
force the regulations; and (4) that forward and sideward re-
straints were required for any luggage placed under a seat.71
E. THE 1981 AMENDMENT
The 1981 Amendment came about in response to a Petition
for Rulemaking by the National Federation of the Blind
(NFB) .72 The FAA initially denied the Petition, but later recon-
sidered and passed section 121.589(e).7 3 This subsection desig-
nated proper stowage for flexible canes of the blind. 4
The NFB represented the concerns of the visually impaired
community in having their canes stowed far from their reach.75
Because they relied so heavily on these devices to move about
safely, the organization undertook a campaign to pressure the
FAA into finding a way to safely stow these canes within reach of
the owner.7 6 In supporting its Petition, the NFB gave the follow-





70 See id. See also Appendix 4, infra, at 598.
71 See Carry-On Baggage, 14 C.F.R. § 121.589 (1980).
72 See Carry-On Baggage-Flexible Travel Cones, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,048 (1981)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 121.589).
73 See id. at 38,048-50.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 38,048.
76 See id.
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ulations created an unreasonable hardship for the blind; (2)
such regulations caused humiliating, discriminatory and unnec-
essary procedures to be set up by the airlines; and (3) a national
Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) research report minimized
the safety impact of having a cane placed near its owner.77 As a
result, section 121.589(a) was amended, and section 121.589(e)
was added, to allow flexible canes to be properly stowed near the
passengers. 7 This was the first of two substantive additions to
section 121.589 brought about as a result of a Petition submitted
by special interest groups affected by the regulation.
F. THE 1987 AMENDMENT
The next amendment, and most recent substantive rewrite of
section 121.589, came about as a result of a second Petition for
Rulemaking, 79 presented by the Association of Flight Attendants
(AFA) .80 The AFA-proposed changes were substantial and cre-
ated much controversy. In the process of writing the final rule
resulting from this Petition, the FAA held two public meetings
and received hundreds of comments. 8' For this reason, it is
helpful to take a deeper look into this particular rulemaking
process, as many of the attitudes and problems discussed in 1987
appear to remain pertinent today.
1. Conditions Leading to AFA's Petition
In spite of the 1980 regulation's attempt to put more responsi-
bility on the air carriers to deal with carry-on baggage before
boarding, enforcement of the carry-on regulations remained
lax. 2 The air carriers were under increasing pressure to
shorten turnaround time and still achieve on-time departures. 8
As the airlines jockeyed for more passengers, more cities, more
gates, more money and lower fares, often the doors to the air-
77 See id.
78 See id. at 38,051-52. See also Appendix 5, infra, at 599.
79 Association of Flight Attendants' Petition for Rulemaking, No. 24220 (Au-
gust 23, 1984) (on file with the FAA Office of Rulemaking) [hereinafter AFA
Petition].
80 See id. The AFA represented 14 carriers and 21,000 flight attendants in the
United States. See id.
81 See id.
82 See id.; see also Carry-On Baggage Program, 52 Fed. Reg. 21,472, 21,473
(1987); Transcript of Public Meeting (July 16, 1986) (comments by Roger Flem-
ming, Air Transport Association).
83 See Transcript of Public Meeting, "Carry-On Baggage Seminar," Docket #
24220 (July 11, 1985) [hereinafter Seminar Transcript].
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craft would be closed behind the last boarding passenger.84 The
aircraft would be pushed off its blocks in order to be "on-time,"
without considering whether passengers were yet seated or
carry-on luggage properly stowed.85 It was not unusual to find a
full plane on the taxiway and passengers still moving about the
cabin trying to find non-existant stowage space.8 6 In such a situ-
ation, and under pressure to get in their own seats and buckled-
up before takeoff, flight attendants frequently stuffed carry-ons
in lavatories and unsecured in closets.8 v As the carry-on baggage
problem became increasingly burdensome, AFA, a major flight
attendant union, moved to correct the problem.
2. AFA's Petition
The AFA first presented its Petition in 1984.8 In its petition,
AFA asked the FAA to make airline enforcement of carry-on lug-
gage regulations stricter and more specific.89 The Petition
asked the FAA to amend the present regulation to include a re-
quirement that air carriers measure and specifically limit the
amount of carry-on bags.90 The Petition's stated purpose was to
fulfill the purpose of the existing regulation governing the
screening of carry-on baggage and to eliminate the hazards
caused by unrestricted carry-on baggage.91 It asked that the
amendment to section 121.589 require screening prior to board-
ing.9 2 The union claimed that flight attendants did not have
time to monitor and stow all carry-ons and still do their
preboarding and boarding duties.93 The AFA stated that they
should not have the sole responsibility of dealing with safe stow-
age of carry-ons. 94 They also stated that the increasing amounts,
sizes and types of items brought on board caused delays and
safety hazards.95 They asked that the FAA adopt the Canadian





88 See AFA Petition, supra note 79; see also Carry-On Baggage Program, 52 Fed.
Reg. at 21,472, pmbl.




93 See id. at 7.
94 See id.
95 See id. at 7-9, 16.
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Model for screening carry-on luggage." The Canadian Model
set up a device with specific dimensions and through which all
carry-on bags must pass in order to be taken on board.97
The Petition enumerated several safety reasons as justification
for making such changes. The Petition stated that strictly con-
trolling carry-on baggage was necessary because such baggage:
1) Can block exits and strike passengers and crew during a
survivable crash;
2) Can dislodge and strike passengers and crew during
turbulence;
3) Can block access to emergency equipment that is stored
in the same compartments as carry-on baggage;
4) Can cause bin latches to fail and injury to result from
falling bags;
5) Can impede evacuation as passengers often try to carry
items off aircraft after impact;
6) Can affect weight and balance;
7) Can block access to life vests under passenger seats;
8) Can cause back and hand injuries to flight attendants
who are then unable to perform their duties during an
emergency;
9) Can prevent flight attendants from performing other
safety duties prior to take off or landing, and from being
at their assigned stations where they can be most effec-
tive in an evacuation; and
10) Can fuel a cabin fire. 8
In addition to the above safety reasons, AFA also stated that ex-
cess carry-on baggage had an economic impact due to delays
and additional fuel needs.99
The flight attendant union supported their Petition with hun-
dreds of comment cards filled out by member flight attend-
ants. ' These cards gave examples of the carry-on problems
they dealt with daily. 01 One flight attendant told of a passenger
who brought a bicycle on board inside of a garment bag. 10 2 Sev-
eral flight attendants spoke of the numerous collapsible strollers
96 See id. at 9.
97 See id.
98 Id. at 16.
19 See id.





they attempted to stow on each flight.' °3 Many of these flight
attendants flew on jumbo jets, such as L1011s, and yet they
stated that they frequently ran out of carry-on stowage space on
the aircraft.10 4 They also reported back and other injuries in-
curred while attempting to assist passengers with their over-
loaded carry-ons.
10 5
The Federal Register published a summary of AFA's Petition on
September 21, 1984.106 The FAA received hundreds of
favorable comments from the public in response to publicity on
the initial petition. 0 7 The vast majority of the public comments
(including those of many businessmen) reflected disgust with
the amounts and types of carry-ons being allowed on board, and
people pleaded with the FAA to "do something." '
3. First Public Meeting
The FAA held its first public meeting on July 11, 1985, to get
comments from the public and industry on AFA's Petition. 10 9 At
the meeting, the FAA distributed its proposed response to AFA's
Petition for Rulemaking and asked for comments. 10 The FAA
stated it would make changes in response to the Petition, but
that the meeting would help it decide what the changes would
be, and under what conditions." 1 Just prior to the meeting, air-
port and aircraft security became a strong focus due to a recent
air terrorism incident.'1 2 Because of political sensitivity and na-
tional attention on the subject, it became even more important
for the FAA to make a substantive response to the petition. 3
Several representatives from different industry groups spoke
at the meeting, presenting their view of the problem and how
they thought the problem could be solved. It is interesting to
note that the Air Transportation Association (ATA), an organi-
zation that represents most major airlines, and People's Express




106 See Petitions for Rulemaking, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,109 (1984).
107 See Air Carriers Certification and Operations: Carry-On Baggage Program,
51 Fed. Reg. 19,134 (1986).
108 See Flight Attendant Comments, supra note 84.
109 See Seminar Transcript, supra note 83.
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ment." 4 They claimed that the new regulations were cumber-
some and costly, and that present regulations were sufficient.1 5
They also claimed that the flight attendants were just trying to
avoid one of their responsibilities so as to do less work.' 6 Peo-
ple's Express, the largest of the new crop of deregulation carri-
ers, stated that the economic impact of the proposed new rules
was too great.'17 It argued that these proposed rules would re-
quire more time for turnarounds at the gate and more ground
personnel."'M It also stated that there was no correlation be-
tween security and carry-on baggage.1' 9
Several other interested parties also spoke. An investigator
with the Office of Civil Aviation Security enumerated many
problems that impacted the ability of screeners to do their
job. 12" He stated that limiting the size and number of articles
permitted as carry-ons would help security.12 ' An AFA represen-
tative reiterated its position, stating that the intent of the 1980
regulation was to get boarding agents to screen carry-ons before
they came on board, but that it had not happened. 22 Addition-
ally, he stated the FAA and the air carriers were not enforcing
the regulations. '23 The Air Line Pilot Association (ALPA), a ma-
jor union for airline pilots, gave its support for AFA's propo-
sal. 124 It was concerned that the additional carry-on weight was
not properly allowed for in the weight and balance under cur-
rent operating procedures.2 5 A representative of the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), who had worked on the
original 1967 regulation, stated that the meaning versus the
spirit of the 1967 regulation had been lost over the years. 126 He
stated that the original intent of the carry-on baggage regulation
was to prevent injury and interference with emergency evacua-
11 See id. (comments by Air Transport Association and People's Express
Airline).
115 See id.




120 See id. (comments by David Leach, Office of Civil Aviation Security).
121 See id.
122 See id. (comments by AFA Representative).
123 See id.
124 See id. (comments by Roger Brooks, ALPA President).
125 See id.




tions.1 27 He was glad to see new rulemaking in progress to fur-
ther this intent.12
8
During a question and answer period, a representative of a
different flight attendant union stated that the regulations were
not working because there were no objective criteria set out in
the regulations. 129 This representative appeared to sum up the
unions' collective thought that it was "ludicrous" to think that
the air carriers would now fix the problem, without new regula-
tions, when they had ignored the current regulations for
years. '1 0 The ATA responded by saying that it was the FAA's re-
sponsibility to enforce its regulations and that it had not done
so. 1 3' If the FAA would more strictly enforce the regulations,
companies who were violating them would pay more attention
to compliance. 32 The FAA, in the preamble of its final rule,
responded that it did not have personnel for that type of
enforcement. 33
4. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
In response to AFA's Petition, and after considering the many
comments received, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) on May 27, 1986.114 This Notice proposed
that air carriers be required to develop and use an approved
carry-on baggage program that would "control, outside the air-
craft, the baggage that will be permitted" in the cabin of the
aircraft.1 35 It also proposed requiring the air carrier to verify
that all carry-on luggage was safely stowed prior to passenger
doors being closed.13 6 It announced a second public meeting
where interested parties would be given an opportunity to speak
out in response to the NPRM.1 37
In the NPRM's preamble, the FAA noted that there was gen-
eral support from commentators for tightening carry-on bag-
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See id. (comments by Ms. Garcia, Teamster's Representative).
130 See id.
131 See id. (comments by Roger Fleming, Air Transport Association).
132 See id.
133 See Carry-On Baggage Program, 52 Fed. Reg. 21,472, 21,474 (1987) (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 121).
134 See Air Carriers Certification and Operations: Carry-On Baggage Program,
51 Fed. Reg. 19,134 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 121).
135 Id. at 19,135.
136 See id. at 19,134.
137 See id.
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gage regulations.138  These commentators cited safety,
inconvenience, and discomfort created by those who carried on
excessive baggage. 3 ' The FAA then proceeded to spell out what
the air carrier's carry-on program should include. 41
5. Second Public Meeting
The second public meeting was held on July 16, 1986.141
Again, the air carrier representatives stressed the economic im-
pact and lack of supporting data to show the necessity of addi-
tional regulations. 12 An American Airlines official claimed that
reducing the workload of the flight attendants and inconve-
niencing many passengers was not enough to justify new regula-
tions.'43 He stated that the airlines had spent a great deal of
money to accommodate passenger carry-on baggage and that
the FAA was only responding to the lobbying efforts of AFA."4
The AFA was not pleased with the watered-down version of
their proposal, and stated that requiring a "carry-on program"
was too vague." 5 Due to the expense, it feared that the airlines
still did not have sufficient motivation to enforce any pro-
gram."' The ALPA was still concerned with the size and weight
of carry-ons and the crashworthiness of the overhead bins." 7 It
again commented on weight and balance concerns and cited
the Ganger 4 . crash as justification.'4 9 The Association of Pro-
fessional Flight Attendants suggested that a flight attendant on-
board the aircraft (instead of a non-crewmember as suggested
by the FAA) would be a more appropriate person to verify
proper stowage of carry-ons before the doors of the aircraft were
1'1 See id. at 19,134-35.
I3 See id.
140 See id. at 19,136-37.
14 See Transcript of Second Public Meeting, Docket # 24996 (July 16, 1986).
1,12 See id. (comments by Air Transport Association).
143 See id. (comments by Gene Overbuck, American Airlines).
144 See id.
1,15 See id. (comments by Association of Flight Attendants).
146 See id.
147 See id. (comments by Air Line Pilots Association).
1,18 A military charter crashed in Ganger, Newfoundland, on December 12,
1985. One of the primary causes of the crash was an incorrect weight and bal-
ance sheet that did not account for a great deal of additional carry-on baggage.
See Administrator v. Schoppaul, 7 N.T.S.B. 1195 (1991). A later Advisory Circular
120-27C put out by the FAA made corrections to the standard weight allotted for
carry-on baggage.
1,1', See Public Meeting, July 16, 1986, ALPA Comments.
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shut. '5 Many different parties and interests spoke, and few
seemed happy with the FAA's solution.
6. Final Rule
The FAA published its final rule on June 5, 1987.151 In the
preamble to the rule, it reviewed the process, different reports
and surveys, and different comments that were considered prior
to publishing the final version of the regulation.152 It listed the
numerous ways in which excessive carry-ons endangered passen-
gers and crewmembers.153 The FAA then stated that the config-
uration of passenger aircraft had changed significantly since the
1967 regulation and that these aircraft now accommodated
more carry-ons.154 It also stated three contributing factors to the
significant increase in carry-ons since 1967: (1) slow and unreli-
able baggage handling; (2) carry-ons save the carriers money;
and (3) air carriers used increased cabin space for carry-ons as a
selling point. 5
The FAA stated that seventy-five percent of the comments re-
ceived from the public supported stricter rules. 56 Among the
reasons cited for support was the fear of injury from bags falling
from overstuffed overhead bins and the inconvenience of carry-
ons blocking aisles during boarding. 57 While many commenta-
tors suggested that the FAA should adopt a single standard, the
FAA stated that by doing so, they would have to accommodate
the lowest common denominator, which would more severely
restrict carry-ons than necessary. 5- In response to both union
and industry objections, the FAA agreed to make a flight attend-
ant responsible for verification of baggage stowage prior to air-
craft doors closing. 159 The ATA objected to the door-closure
rule, but the FAA stated that without it, the aircraft would have
to return to the gate if improper or inadequate stowage oc-
',50 See id. (comments by Gail Maconery, Association of Professional Flight
Attendants).
1 See Carry-On Baggage Program, 52 Fed. Reg. at 21,472. See also Appendix 6,
infra, at 600.
152 See 52 Fed. Reg. at 21,472-76.
153 See id. at 21,472.
154 See id.
155 See id.
1515 See id. at 21,473.
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 21,472.
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curred. "'I This way the carrier would have greater motivation to
comply.
In response to ALPA's concern over weight and balance fac-
tors, the FAA stated that this was outside the scope of this partic-
ular rulemaking.'"' In response to AFA's push for specific
criteria regarding size and amount of baggage permitted, the
FAA indicated that this should be included in each carrier's
carry-on program, and that the program would be meaningless
if this was not stated. 162
The FAA concluded by stating that the final rule was a bal-
ance between safety concerns and the convenience of the travel-
ing public.'" 3 It listed the benefits of the new rule as: (1)
prevention of fatalities and injuries resulting from improperly
stowed baggage; (2) improved egress from an aircraft in a surviv-
able impact; and (3) fewer injuries from dislodged carry-ons fall-
ing and striking passengers during an abrupt deceleration or
altitude change. 164 The airline industry was given 180 days from
the effective date of the regulation (June 5, 1987) to comply. 65
G. THE 1995 AMENDMENT
The 1995 amendment did not change the substance of sec-
tion 121.589, but it did extend its applicability to commuter air-
lines, which had previously been governed by section 135.166
This was part of the larger amendment, known as "the com-
muter rule," which was incorporated as a new section 119.117
Under the new section, the application of Part 121, which has
more restrictive requirements, was broadened to include com-
muter airlines with a passenger seating capacity of ten to thirty
seats. 168
160 See id.





166 See Commuter Operations and General Certification and Operations Re-
quirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,832 (1996) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 91, 119,
121, 125, 127, and 135).
167 See id.
168 See id. See also Appendix 7, infra, at 602.
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H. CURRENT STATUS
Ten years have passed since the last section 121.589 substan-
tive amendment. This, in itself, indicates progress. According
to an FAA official, the FAA has no current plans to revise the
existing carry-on baggage regulation further.169 Statistics moni-
tored by a flight attendant union indicate a significant decrease
in reported cabin injury incidents involving carry-on baggage. 70
Additionally, requests for the FAA to interpret carry-on baggage
regulations have been minimal. 171
While there has been some improvement in carry-on baggage
problems since 1987, it is likely that many of the comments by
the different interests represented at the two public meetings
reviewed above would be repeated today. As enforcement con-
tinues to be lax, it appears the air carriers still do not fully recog-
nize the safety concerns caused by carry-on baggage. 172 This is
understandable, as the economic impact on the carriers could
be high. As stated earlier, unless passengers choose to bring less
baggage with them, a stricter enforcement of the carry-on bag-
gage regulations would require more ground personnel to deal
with additional checked baggage. Additionally, it is possible
that the longer check-in process due to processing additional
baggage could require extended gate time, turnaround time,
and additional costs to the airlines. However, it is also very likely
that the public would adapt to a longer check-in process and
arrive earlier, if they knew that their carry-ons would be strictly
monitored at the gate prior to boarding.
No air carrier wants to be the first to strictly monitor carry-
ons. It is bad public relations for a carrier if it is stricter than the
others. Service is primarily what drives loyalty when the ticket
price is the same. The air carriers would like the FAA to be the
enforcer and take the brunt of the negative public reaction. At
the same time, it is logistically impossible for the FAA to monitor
each airline to see if it is strictly enforcing its stated carry-on
baggage program. Yet, carry-ons continue to be a subject of
169 See Author's unofficial interview with official in FAA Office of Flight Stan-
dards (Feb. 1997).
170 See Author's unofficial interview with an airline industry union representa-
tive (Mar. 1997).
171 SeeJosEPH D. KUCHTA, FEDERAL AVIATION DECISIONS (Feb. 1997).
172 See Tim Friend, Watch Your Head inJet's Aisle Seat, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 1997,
at Al.
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concern to the airlines and the flight attendants.173 One air car-
rier flight attendant supervisor stated that carry-ons continue to
be a flight attendant's "biggest nightmare."' 74 As a result, this
supervisor stated that most air carriers have on-going commit-
tees trying to come up with innovative ways to lessen the nega-
tive impact of excessive carry-ons. 17 5 The amount of carry-on
baggage brought onboard an airplane is still significant.
I. INDUSTRY EFFORTS
Since 1987, the airlines have tried to make passengers more
aware of the limits they technically impose on passengers at the
airport. Carry-on baggage policies are printed on the back of
tickets. Airline reservation agents often advise passengers of
carry-on limits. Most airlines give verbal reminders during the
boarding and landing announcements. 176 Some airlines have
even placed cartoon reminders of carry-on safety on their over-
head bins. 177 While these different measures may have had
some impact, the issue still remains: are these efforts enough?
III. LITIGATION
One means of evaluating the effectiveness of the current regu-
lation is by considering what effect, if any, section 121.589 has
had on tort cases involving injuries caused by falling carry-on
baggage since the 1987 revision. Principles of negligence, as
well as the regulations and the air carrier's FAA-approved carry-
on baggage program, set the standards by which the carrier is
evaluated.
Most personal injury cases that occur as a result of falling
carry-on baggage are brought as negligence actions. In order to
be successful in proving negligence, a plaintiff must prove that
the airline had a duty of care to its passengers, that the duty was
breached, and that the cause of that breach resulted in plain-
tiff's injuries. 78 A commercial airline is considered a common
carrier and therefore held to the "highest degree of care and




176 See Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc., 24 F.3d 39, 40-41 (9th Cir. 1994).
177 See Author's telephone interview with flight attendant supervisor for Alaska
Airlines (Mar. 1997).




skill [under the law] in everything that concerns the safety of its
passengers."17 9 Some have described this duty as the "utmost
care and the vigilance of a very cautious person towards [its]
passengers."' 8 ° Others have used a more objective standard,
stating that this duty is "to 'take reasonable precautions to pro-
tect [patrons] from dangers[,] which are foreseeable from the
arrangement or use of [their] property,' and 'to protect its pas-
sengers from other travelers."" 8" In either case, the duty of care
is established by law at the highest level. Thus, a personal injury
claim usually centers around whether the airline breached that
duty of care through its actions or omissions. Demonstrating
that an air carrier has exercised a sufficient amount of care, in
spite of the injury, is the key to protecting the carrier from
liability.
In an examination of twenty-one cases decided between 1988
and 1996, thirteen were found to have been decided in favor of
the plaintiff and eight in favor of the airline. These cases do not
indicate the final disposition of the case unless a party was actu-
ally granted summary judgment. However, in over one-half of
the cases, the court remanded the case for settlement or trial.
In the cases remanded, the court inevitably held that the dispute
centered on facts in dispute and that ajury was the appropriate
forum. Nevertheless, conflicting results emerge. Among those
summary judgment cases remanded and those affirmed, many
had similar facts and allegations.
The primary allegations made by plaintiffs regarding the air
carrier's breach of duty included: (1) insufficient monitoring of
carry-on stowage during the boarding process; (2) not prevent-
ing overloading and improper loading of overhead bins; (3) fail-
ing to inspect the bins; (4) inadequate warnings about the
dangers caused by carry-ons placed overhead; and (5) failure to
act on notice of a dangerous condition caused by placing carry-
ons in overhead bins. The airlines often defended themselves
by claiming preemption, passenger intervention, or no causal
link.
179 Cherone v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., Civ. A. No. HAR 87-854, 1988 WL 40568,
at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 18, 1988).
180 Andrews, 24 F.3d at 40 (alterations in the original) (citation omitted).
181 Aponte v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 6337 (LMM), 1996 WL
527339, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1996) (citations omitted).
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A. PREEMPTION
Several airlines unsuccessfully tried to use the doctrine of pre-
emption to circumvent consideration of the merits of the plain-
tiff's claim. With one exception,'82 the higher courts overturned
every summary judgment based on this doctrine. The preemp-
tion defense extended from section 1305(a) (1) of the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, which stated that no state "shall enact
or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision
having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes or
services of any air carrier having authority under Title V of this
Act to provide air transportation.""18 In using this defense, air-
lines claimed that they were immune from any prosecution be-
cause any injury incurred as a result of a falling carry-on bag fell
under the "services" area of an airline.
In Zachary v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., the only case dismissed
under the preemption doctrine, the court reported few de-
tails.'84 However, the opinion did state that the court's holding
in Zachary was based on holdings in two earlier U.S. court of
appeals cases applying the preemption doctrine.' 85 Upon exam-
ination in both cases, however, it is apparent that the court ap-
plied preemption to non-negligence claims.' 86 Moreover, since
1992, the cases surveyed reveal that no other airline has been
successful in using a preemption argument as a basis for
dismissal.
As the result of a 1992 Supreme Court opinion regarding the
airline preemption issue, 87 subsequent courts have held that
Congress intended the preemption from state regulation to pro-
tect what services an airline could offer, and that it did not in-
tend to protect air carriers from common law negligence
claims.' In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Supreme
Court discussed the purpose of the preemption clause in the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and its appropriate application
182 See Zachary v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., No. Civ. A. No. H-90-1999, 1991 WL
487289 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 1991).
1-3 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (1978).
184 See Zachary, 1991 WL 487829, at *1.
15 See id. at *2 (citing O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11, 13 (5th
Cir. 1989)); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773, 780 (5th Cir.
1990).
16 See O'Carroll, 863 F.2d at 12 (where a passenger was denied transportation
due to intoxication and irregularity with his ticket); Trans World Airlines, 897 F.2d
at 778-79, 783 (where the state tried to regulate airline advertising).
18 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
1 See Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 1995).
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to different types of claims against airlines.18 It stated that the
intention of Congress was to prevent states from imposing their
own laws on the airlines and prevent the intended economic
deregulation. 90
In Margolis v. United Airlines, the court went to great lengths to
trace the history of the preemption doctrine and the intent of
Congress.' The Margolis court applied the Supreme Court's
holding in Morales, stating that the application of federal pre-
emption over state regulations related to airline routes, rates
and services, but did not extend to negligence claims brought by
individuals. 9 2 Another court threw out the preemption de-
fense, quoting Morales in stating that "some state actions may
affect airline... services in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a
manner to have a preemptive effect."'9 3
B. PASSENGER INTERVENTION
Airlines have been most successful in avoiding liability when
they can convince the court that other factors over which they
had no control caused the accident. Several courts have stated
that an airline is "not an insurer of a passenger's safety.' 1 94 In
spite of this statement, however, courts have varied on how they
apply passenger intervention to the case at bar. Similar facts
often brought opposite conclusions. In ten of the cases sur-
veyed, another passenger opened the bin from which the carry-
on fell, causing the plaintiff injury. Nevertheless, six courts held
that an airline could possibly be held liable and that the ques-
tion was appropriate for ajury. Four other courts supported the
defendant airlines' position that it had no control over a passen-
ger's actions and could not be held liable.
In Pardo v. Delta Airlines, Inc., a camera case fell out of an over-
head bin when a passenger opened the bin to retrieve his cam-
era. 95 The court held that Delta was not negligent for an injury
caused by the actions of others and granted Delta summary
189 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 386-87.
190 See id. at 383.
191 See Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318, 320-21 (E.D. Mich.
1993).
192 See id. at 323 (citations omitted).
193 Heller v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 1937, 1993 WL 330093, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1993) (quoting Morales, 304 U.S. at 390).
194 Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., No. 94-2392, 1996 WL 117512, at *2
(6th Cir. Mar. 15, 1996); see also Schwamb v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 516 So. 2d 452,
462 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Andrews, 24 F.3d at 40.
195 See Pardo v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 26 (D. Puerto Rico 1991).
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judgment."' The plaintiff had no evidence that the overhead
bins were overloaded or improperly loaded. Consequently, the
court stated "speculations and conjectures" would not defeat a
motion for summary judgment.'97 On the other hand, in An-
drews v. United Airlines, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reversed summary
judgment for United Airlines and remanded the case for trial
when a briefcase fell from an overhead bin, injuring a passen-
ger."'8 The Andrews court stated that there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether an airline "had a duty to do more
than warn passengers about the possibility of falling baggage." 199
While Andrews made no claim of wrongdoing by airline person-
nel ,200 the court stated that an airline had a heightened duty as a
common carrier to "use the best precautions in practical use
'known to any company exercising the utmost care and dili-
gence in keeping abreast with modern improvement .... "'201 It
then pointed out that the airline "may not have done everything
technology permits and prudence dictates to eliminate [the
hazard]."202
C. No CAUSAL TIE
Often the plaintiff is unable to make the causal tie between
the carrier's actions and the actual incident that caused the in-
jury. In another set of cases with similar facts regarding causa-
tion, the courts reached opposite conclusions. In two cases
where a bin opened on landing for no apparent reason, spilling
luggage and causing a passenger injury, one court granted the
airline summary judgment 203 while the other court affirmed a
jury verdict of negligence for the plaintiff.204
In both cases, the plaintiff applied a res ipsa loquitur claim.
Under this doctrine, negligence could be inferred on the part of
the defendant when, in the absence of direct proof, the plaintiff
proved that: (1) the injury was unlikely to occur in the absence
of negligence; and (2) the means by which the injury occurred
9(i See id. at 29.
1,17 Id. at 28.
198 See Andrews, 24 F.3d at 40.
199 Id. at 42.
2 0o See id. at 40.
201 Id. at 42 (citations omitted).
202 1d. at 41.
203 See Robinson, 1996 WL 117512, at *3.
204 See Smith v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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was under the sole control of the defendant. 20 5 One court held
that the closing of the bin was in the exclusive control of the
airline. 20 6 No one had opened it during flight and the flight
attendants were the last to check the condition of the overhead
bins before descent. 21 7 The other court held that the bin was
not in the exclusive control of the airline, as it was just as possi-
ble that a passenger opened the bin while the plane was still
taxiing.20 8
D. MONITORING/OVERLOADING AND IMPROPER LOADING OF
BINs/DUTY TO INSPECT
Several cases have discussed what the duty to prevent over-
loading or improper loading of overhead compartments entails.
In Ginter v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the court stated an airline's
duty was to "observe that passengers were stowing their baggage
in a reasonable manner, to provide assistance, as requested, and
to make a visual check to assure that compartment doors were
closed on takeoff. ' 20 9 Moreover, it expressly stated that this duty
did not include opening each bin to inspect the contents. 2 1°
However, in Brosnahan v. Western Airlines, Inc., the court stated
that an airline had a duty to prevent injury by assisting passen-
gers with the stowing of their carry-ons, even when not asked.211
In Brosnahan, a passenger who was attempting to stow his carry-
on bag injured the plaintiff when he dropped the bag on the
plaintiff's head. The court stated that an airline had a duty to
supervise and assist passengers with the stowage of their carry-
ons throughout the boarding process.21 2 Nevertheless, in Baker
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the court stated that an airline's negligence
liability could be inferred by whether or not a flight attendant
assisted in stowage of the carry-on.2 3 In Aponte v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., a radio fell from overhead, injuring the plaintiff.
The court said that part of the airline's duty was to stop passen-
gers from stowing improper items like radios and ensure that
205 See id. at 916.
206 See id. at 917-18.
207 See id. at 918.
208 See Robinson, 1996 WL 117512, at *3.
209 Ginter v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 538 N.Y.S.2d 638, 640 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989).
210 See id.
211 See Brosnahan v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 892 F.2d 730, 734 (8th Cir. 1989).
212 See id. at 733.
213 See Baker v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 03A01-9312-CV-00431, 1994 WL
283858, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 1994).
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the bins were not overstuffed.2 4 This would mean that a crew
complement of three to four flight attendants on a full 737
would have to monitor over 140 passengers individually stowing
their carry-ons while taking care of other preboarding
responsibilities.2 15
Some cases allege a duty to enforce weight requirements as to
both individual items placed in overhead bins and total weight
placed in a bin. One court stated that an airline had a duty to
prevent an overweight bag from being stowed overhead as per a
quoted tariff.216 However, the Ginter court noted that there was
no industry custom dictating what could or could not be placed
in bins overhead, as long as they complied with weight require-
ments.217 An FAA official stated that the weight placarded in
each of the bins was actually a minimum weight, and that the
overhead bins were able to hold a great deal more weight than
indicated. 218 Thus, in spite of the FAA's reassurance as to the
amount of weight an overhead bin can withstand, there remains
a very real concern about the injuries caused by heavy items fall-
ing on passengers below. It is also interesting to note that the
carry-on baggage regulations do not give any specific guidance
as to how an airline should monitor the weight.
219
E. SUFFICIENT WARNINGS
There are recurring themes regarding whether warnings were
given, and if given, whether they were sufficient. In Bravis v.
Dunbar, the court held that the two warnings given by the flight
attendants regarding the use of care in removing overhead bag-
gage were sufficient to meet the airline's duty of care. 22 0 Addi-
tionally, in Haley v. United Airlines, Inc., the Fourth Circuit stated
that when the passenger knew of the dangers of carry-ons being
placed above her due to her own observations and experience,
whether or not the airline gave warning was not important. 221
However, other courts have questioned whether warnings, even
214 See Aponte, 1996 WL 527339, at *3.
215 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.391(a)(4) (1997) (requiring one flight attendant for
every 50 passengers when seating capacity is over 100).
216 See Baker, 1994 WL 28358, at *1.
217 See Ginter, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
218 See Author's unofficial interview with official in FAA Office of Flight Stan-
dards (Feb. 1997).
219 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.589 (1997).
220 See Bravis v. Dunbar, 449 S.E.2d 495, 497 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
221 See Haley v. United Airlines, Inc., Nos. 89-3350, 89-3373, 1991 WL 27153, at
*2 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 1991).
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though given, were sufficient. For example, the Andrews court
stated that an airline still had a duty to do everything within its
power to avoid any foreseeable injury because of its high duty of
care as a common carrier.222
Because injuries from falling carry-on baggage are a recurring
problem for all airlines, many courts see these injuries as fore-
seeable and probably preventable. Suggested preventive meas-
ures have included retrofitting the bins with retaining nets,
limiting items placed overhead to lightweight items, and giving
significantly stronger direction and warning regarding the dan-
gers of improper loading of carry-ons.223 However, airlines have
claimed that the low incidence of injuries prove that these safety
measures would not merit the additional costs. 224 Because the
airlines have not implemented more of these suggestions, they
apparently do not believe the costs outweigh the benefits.
F. NOTICE
Some plaintiffs, as in Schwamb v. Delta Airlines, Inc., tried to
claim that because items had fallen out of an overhead compart-
ment and caused injury in the past, the carrier was on notice
and thus required to take some kind of preventive action.225 In
Schwamb, the plaintiffs expert suggested ways in which several
additional warnings could be added to operational procedures
at little cost to the carrier.226 However, in Cherone v. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc., the court stated that a carrier was liable for the inju-
ries to its passenger only when "the carrier had actual notice of
the hazardous condition in time to correct it, and failed to do so
"1227
G. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
What action should air carriers take in order to carry out their
duty of due care to ensure passenger safety while reducing their
potential risk of liability from injuries caused by falling carry-on
baggage? Charles 0. Miller, an expert on aviation safety used by
the plaintiff in Schwamb presented several suggestions that merit
consideration. First, he suggested that the pre-boarding an-
222 See Andrews, 24 F.3d at 40.
223 See id. at 41; see also Schwamb, 516 So. 2d at 463.
224 See Andrews, 24 F.3d at 41.
225 See Schwamb, 516 So. 2d at 462-63.
226 See id. at 463.
227 Cherone, 1988 WL 40568, at *2.
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nouncement include instructions on how carry-on items can be
safely stowed. 22 ' This small addition to flight attendant board-
ing announcements would cost the air carriers nothing and give
passengers common sense reminders about the importance of
proper stowage. Mr. Miller's next suggestion was to announce
to passengers that they should leave compartments open and
have the flight attendants take the responsibility to visually
check each compartment as they closed it prior to take-off.229
Again, the airline would incur no cost. Mr. Miller also suggested
that additional warnings be given during the safety briefing
prior to take-off, and that warnings be placed on the plastic
safety card with pictorial explanations of how to properly stow
and remove baggage from overhead bins. 2311
Dr. David Thompson, another expert presented by the plain-
tiff in Andrews v. United Airlines, suggested that bins be retrofit-
ted with baggage nets or that airlines restrict the type of items
placed overhead.21' According to Dr. Thompson, British Air-
ways and Virgin Atlantic Airlines have already implemented bag-
gage nets. 232 However, United countered these .suggestions by
claiming that injuries resulting from falling carry-ons were rare
and that neither the cost to the airline nor the inconvenience to
the passengers could be justified.23 Nonetheless, retrofitting
bins with nets continues to be a possibility as manufacturing
companies continue to work on making the expense of retrofit-
ting the overhead bins cost effective.23 4
Another suggestion involved the actual monitoring of carry-
on weight, along with size and amounts, prior to actual board-
ing.2 5 This suggestion is more problematic. In order to check
weight, a scale of some sort would be needed in the jetway prior
to boarding. This would cause congestion and impede a smooth
boarding process. The process would most likely have to take
place in the boarding area and be monitored by the gate agents
or other ground personnel. Because implementation of this
suggestion would most likely require additional personnel to
228 See Schwamb, 516 So. 2d at 463.
229 See id.
230 See id.
231 See Andrews, 24 F.3d at 41.
232 See id. at n.1; Kevin Rafferty, Tricky Thoughts Aloft, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 2,
1992, at X1.
233 See Andrews, 24 F.3d at 41.
234 Bridport Aviation Products, in Bridport, England, is manufacturing a stow-
age bin visor system, which it claims can be installed at minimal cost.
235 See AFA Petition, supra note 79.
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work each flight, an airline would incur undesirable, additional
costs.
Many of Mr. Miller's suggestions could be implemented with
little or no cost to the carrier. Safety cards must be regularly
reprinted for each type of aircraft and could conceivably include
safety warnings about carry-on stowage. In the past ten years,
many of Mr. Miller's suggestions regarding announcements
have been implemented. Passengers are regularly instructed in
both pre-landing and taxiing announcements to be cautious
when opening overhead bins, as items placed within may have
shifted. 236 These additional instructions and warnings could ed-
ucate travelers about potential safety hazards and how to avoid
them.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fact that very few cases have been published leads one to
believe that most complaints are either settled by the airline out
of court or are not appealed. It is less expensive to deal with
such complaints in this manner than to deal with litigation and
negative publicity costs. Additionally, the price the airlines pay
in out-of-court settlements is balanced by the price the airlines
assume they will pay in lost revenue due to perceived lack of
customer service. This assumption is enough to deter any
change in the way an airline deals with its carry-on baggage
policies.
Airlines today operate as big businesses. Airlines continually
look for new ways to attract more business. The current chal-
lenge is not so much in getting a passenger from point A to
point B, but in getting the passenger to his destination while
providing a competitive service and a safe operation at mini-
mum operating cost and risk liability. Because of this stiff com-
petition, airlines have at times closed their eyes to potential
safety hazards, and the FAA has had to create new regulations to
rectify the problems. While the industry often fights these regu-
lations due to the economic impact on an airline's operation, it
also welcomes an outside entity making rules that apply to all.
The competitive nature of the airline industry makes the air-
lines reluctant to withdraw a service of convenience the public
has come to expect. The federal regulations have assisted in
curtailing many of the more blatant carry-on baggage problems,
236 See Andrews, 24 F.3d at 40-41.
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but the primary enforcement of the regulations has been left to
the individual carriers. Thus, the airlines continue in their en-
deavor to find creative solutions to excessive carry-on baggage
woes, short of actual strict enforcement.
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APPENDIX 1
§ 121.589 Carry-On Baggage.
(a) No certificate holder may permit a passenger to carry any
article of baggage aboard an airplane unless-
(1) That article is stowed in a suitable baggage or cargo stor-
age compartment, or is stowed as provided in paragraph (c) of
§ 121.285; or
(2) That article can be stowed under a passenger seat.
(b) After April 24, 1969, no certificate holder may permit a
passenger to carry any article of baggage aboard an airplane
under paragraph (a) (2) of this section unless that article can be
stowed under a passenger seat in such a way that it will not slide
forward under crash impacts severe enough to induce the inertia
loads specified in § 25.561 (b) (3).
Issued in Washington, D.C., on September 15, 1967.
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APPENDIX 2
§ 121.589 Carry-On Baggage
(b) After August 24, 1969, no certificate holder may permit a
passenger to carry any article of baggage aboard an airplane
under paragraph (a) (2) of this section unless that article can be
stowed under a passenger seat in such a way that it will not slide
forward under crash impacts severe enough to induce the ulti-
mate inertia forces specified in § 25.561 (b) (3) of this chapter or
the requirements of the Civil Air Regulations under which the
aircraft was type certificated. A certificate holder may obtain an
additional extension of the compliance date but not beyond Oc-
tober 24, 1969, from the air carrier district office charged with
the overall supervision of its operation by showing that good
cause exists for the extension.
Issued in Washington, D.C., on March 18, 1969.
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APPENDIX 3
§ 121.589 Carry-On Baggage.
(a) No certificate holder may permit an airplane to take off or
land unless each article of baggage carried aboard by passengers
is stowed-
(1) In a suitable baggage or cargo stowage compartment;
(2) As provided in paragraph (c) of § 121.285; or
(3) Under a passenger seat.
(b) Each passenger shall comply with instructions given by
crewmembers regarding compliance with paragraph (a) of this
section.
(c) Each passenger seat under which baggage is permitted to
be stowed shall be fitted with a means to prevent articles of bag-
gage stowed under it from sliding forward under crash impacts
severe enough to induce the ultimate inertia forces specified in
§ 25.561 (b) (3) of this chapter or in the emergency landing con-
dition regulations under which the aircraft was type certificated.
Issued in Washington, D.C., on February 15, 1972.
1998] 597
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE
APPENDIX 4
§ 121.589 Carry-On Baggage.
(a) No certificate holder may allow the boarding of carry-on
baggage on an aircraft unless the baggage can be stowed in ac-
cordance with this section. No certificate holder may allow an
aircraft to take off or land unless each article of baggage carried
aboard the aircraft is stowed-
(1) In a suitable closet or baggage or cargo stowage compart-
ment placarded for its maximum weight and providing proper
restraint for all baggage or cargo stowed within, and in a man-
ner that does not hinder the possible use of any emergency
equipment; or
(2) As provided in § 121.285(c); or
(3) Under a passenger seat.
(b) Baggage, other than articles of loose clothing, may not be
placed in an overhead rack unless that rack is equipped with ap-
proved restraining devices or doors.
(c) Each passenger must comply with instructions given by
crewmembers regarding compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b)
of this section.
(d) Each passenger seat under which baggage is allowed to be
stowed shall be fitted with a means to prevent articles of baggage
stowed under it from sliding forward. In addition, after August
31, 1983, each aisle seat shall be fitted with a means to prevent
articles or baggage stowed under it from sliding sideward into
the aisle under crash impacts severe enough to induce the ulti-
mate inertia forces specified in emergency landing condition
regulations under which the aircraft was type certificated.




§ 121.589 Carry-On Baggage.
(c) Each passenger must comply with instructions given by
crewmembers regarding compliance with paragraphs (a), (b),
and (e) of this section.
(e) In addition to the methods of stowage in paragraph (a),
flexible travel canes carried by blind individuals may be stowed-
(1) Under any series of connected passenger seats in the same
row, if the cane does not protrude into an aisle and if the cane
is flat on the floor; or
(2) Between a nonemergency exit window seat and the fuse-
lage, if the cane is flat on the floor; or
(3) Beneath any two nonemergency exit window seats, if the
cane is flat on the floor; or
(4) In accordance with any other method approved by the
administrator.
Issued in Washington, D.C., on June 22, 1981.
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APPENDIX 6
§ 121.589 Carry-On Baggage.
(a) No certificate holder may allow the boarding of carry-on
baggage on an airplane unless each passenger's baggage has
been scanned to control the size and amount carried on board in
accordance with an approved carry-on baggage program in its
operations specifications. In addition, no passenger may board
an airplane if his/her carry-on baggage exceeds the baggage al-
lowance prescribed in the carry-on baggage program in the cer-
tificate holder's operations specifications.
(b) No certificate holder may allow all passenger entry doors
of an airplane to be closed in preparation for taxi or pushback
unless at least one required crewmember has verified that each
article of baggage is stowed in accordance with this section and
§ 121.285(c) of this part.
(c) No certificate holder may allow an airplane to take off or
land unless each article of baggage is stowed:
(1) In a suitable closet or baggage or cargo stowage compart-
ment placarded for its maximum weight and providing proper
restraint for all baggage or cargo stowed within, and in a man-
ner that does not hinder the possible use of any emergency
equipment; or
(2) As provided in § 121.285(c) of this part; or
(3) Under a passenger seat.
(d) Baggage, other than articles of loose clothing, may not be
placed in an overhead rack unless that rack is equipped with ap-
proved restraining devices or doors.
(e) Each passenger must comply with instructions given by
crewmembers regarding compliance with paragraphs (a), (b),
(c), (d), and (g) of this section.
(f) Each passenger seat under which baggage is allowed to be
stowed shall be fitted with a means to prevent articles of baggage
stowed under it from sliding forward. In addition, each aisle seat
shall be fitted with a means to prevent articles of baggage stowed
under it from sliding sideward into the aisle under crash impacts
severe enough to induce the ultimate inertia forces specified in
the emergency landing condition regulations under which the
airplane was type certificated.
(g) In addition to the methods of stowage in paragraph (c) of
this section, flexible travel canes carried by blind individuals may
be stowed-
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(1) Under any series of connected passenger seats in the same
row, if the cane does not protrude into an aisle and if the cane
is flat on the floor; or
(2) Between a nonemergency exit window seat and the fuse-
lage, if the cane is flat on the floor; or
(3) Beneath any two nonemergency exit window seats, if the
cane is flat on the floor; or
(4) In accordance with any other method approved by the
Administrator.
Issued in Washington, D.C., on May 29, 1987.
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APPENDIX 7
§ 121.589. Carry-On Baggage.
(b) No certificate holder may allow all passenger entry doors
of an airplane to be closed in preparation for taxi or pushback
unless at least one required crewmember has verified that each
article of baggage is stowed in accordance with this section and
§ 121.285 (c) and (d) of this part.
(c) No certificate holder may allow an airplane to take off or
land unless each article of baggage is stowed:
(2) As provided in § 121.285 (c) and (d) of this part; ....
Issued in Washington, D.C., on December 12, 1995.
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